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This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection  in  game theory based on studying  . 
the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived 
from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that  are not isolated. Instead, 
Nash equilibria that specify different out-of-equilibrium behaviour appear in connected compo- 
nents of stationary states. The stability properties of these components can depend critically on 
the perturbations to which the system is subjected. We argue that it is then important to incorpor- 
ate such drift  into the model. A sufficient condition  is  provided  for drift  to create stationary 
states, with strong stability properties, near a component of equilibria. Applications to questions 
of forward and backward induction are developed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Backward induction performs badly in predicting the outcome of laboratory experiments 
in some games, but well  in  others. Forward induction is similarly erratic.'  In the face  of 
such mounting evidence from carefully run experiments, game theorists are reconsidering 
their theories of equilibrium selection.  Why  do the principles of forward and backward 
induction sometimes work and sometimes  fail? We need a theory that explains when and 
why  experienced and well-motivated players honour  or  ignore such principles. In this 
paper, we  argue that players' behaviour is often consistent with game theory, even  when 
backward and forward induction fail-provided  we  recognize that people must learn to 
play  games  in an imperfect world. 
In Binmore and Samuelson (1 994) and  Binmore, Gale  and  Samuelson (1999, we 
showed that simple models of learning can direct players to  Nash  equilibria in the Ulti- 
matum  Game in  which player 2 receives a significant share of the surplus-a  result closer 
to experimental observations than  to the subgame-perfect prediction. This paper broadens 
the scope of our study of perturbed learning processes. We show that  our results for the 
Ultimatum Game are not pathological by analysing several equally well-known  games. 
Our methodology requires examining the stability properties of  the Nash equilibria 
of  games, paying close attention  to  the perturbations  of  the learning process that  are 
intended to  stand  in for the many imperfections of  the world that  are idealized  away 
when formulating an  abstract  model. Until recently it was taken for granted that such 
perturbations could be  relied upon to eliminate weakly dominated strategies. But  Binmore 
et  al.  (1994,  1995) show to the contrary  that  vanishingly small perturbations can actually 
1.  Davis and Holt (1993) and Kagel and Roth (1995)  survey the experimental literature. 
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play a key  role in stabilizing Nash equilibria in  weakly  dominated strategies that would 
be  refined away if forward or backward induction criteria were applied. 
We use the term drqt to summarize the  perturbations  to  be studied and address the 
following questions. When does such drift matter? What  can  be said about equilibrium 
selection  when it does? 
The  landscape  metaphor.  Our answers to these questions are easiest to understand 
when  expressed  in terms of the landscape metaphor used  by biologists in  discussing  evol- 
utionary dynamics. It is commonplace to think  of  a stable equilibrium as lying at the 
bottom of a pit that represents its basin of attraction. The dynamic system under study is 
then envisaged as  a ball that rolls down the sides of the pit, eventually coming to rest at 
the equilibrium  at the  bottom.  Evolutionary  drift  becomes important  when  the pit  is 
replaced by a valley with a flat floor of equilibria. Once the ball reaches the floor of such 
a valley, its movement is determined by  tiny  shocks which can be  neglected  when  the 
system is not close to equilibrium (because they are then vanishingly  small compared with 
the selection pressures that power the evolutionary dynamics). These tiny shocks represent 
the  perturbations we call drift. 
The importance of  genetic drift in  biology  has been emphasized by  many authors. 
Kimura (1983) argues that drift may account for  the bulk of genetic variation. Our con- 
cern is with drift  through  landscapes that contain  hanging  valleys, with  one end  of  a 
hanging valley cutting  into  the  wall of an adjoining, deeper valley. Hanging valleys appear 
to have received little attention in  biology  or elsewhere. In single-person decision prob- 
lems,  even  a flat-bottomed  valley  is  a sufficiently exceptional occurrence as to be  safely 
ignored. But flat-bottomed, hanging valleys are common in landscapes corresponding to 
the strategic situations modeled by  games, arising out of  the same freedom to choose 
actions  at unreached  information  sets  that  gives  rise  to  the  equilibrium  refinements 
literature. 
When a ball reaches the flat floor of a hanging valley,  even  very  small amounts of 
drift  can  be large compared to  the  weak  selection  pressures that  surround  the equilibria 
lying on  the  floor. Small amounts of  drift  can then  have a large effect. The outcome 
depends on the overall direction of the drift that operates in the valley.  If the drift propels 
the ball away from unstable equilibria that can sit on the edge of  a precipice  where  the 
hanging valley cuts into  the  wall of  an adjoining, deeper valley, then the system will  be 
stabilized in the hanging valley. Alternatively, the drift may propel the ball  over  the cliff- 
edge, whereupon strong selection pressures reappear and the ball plunges to the floor of 
the deeper valley. But the  story  may not end here, for the deeper valley  may  itself  hang 
above a  further valley. It may even hang above the original valley. The slopes transversed 
by one player in a strategic interaction are themselves moving in response to the changing 
play of other players, allowing the landscapes of evolutionary dynamics to resemble those 
of Escher, in  which  one may walk consistently down stairs, but find  oneself  on a higher 
story. 
Refinements.  The different equilibria found  on  the flat floor of a hanging valley,  in 
the landscape metaphor, typically correspond to differences in play  off  the equilibrium 
path.  The ability to  adopt various plans of action for out-of-equilibrium contingencies is 
reflected in a variety of alternative best replies to  the strategies of the equilibrium profile. 
Until recently, the equilibrium refinements literature sought to address the problem of 
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or implicit “trembles.” Our  approach replaces such trembles by a  drift term built into  an 
explicit equilibrating process. 
When drift stabilizes the system  in a hanging valley, plans of action for dealing with 
out-of-equilibrium contingencies that  are  condemned as “irrational” by  one refinement 
concept or  another  may not be  cleansed  from the equilibrium strategies. The standard 
assumptions of refinement theories will then fail. The evolutionary process provides press- 
ures that inhibit such irrationalities, but the limiting outcome of the evolutionary process 
depends on the relative rates at which different kinds of irrationality are eliminated. Very 
frequently,  the  selection  process  is  so  adept  at stamping  out  certain  very  deleterious 
irrationalities that it reaches an equilibrium before it has had  a chance to wipe out  other 
types  of  irrationality.  Refinement criteria that deny the possibility  of  the latter type of 
irrationality then fail to be honoured in the limit. 
Outline.  The model is presented in  Section  2. Our point of departure is a system of 
continuous,  deterministic differential equations  describing how  the proportions  of  the 
player-populations attached  to  each strategy adjust over time. We  view  this system as a 
model of the selection or learning forces that. guide players’  decisions. Section 2 explains 
the sense  in  which  these differential equations can serve as an approximation of an under- 
lying, stochastic strategy-adjustment process governing the behaviour of the players in the 
game. In terms of the landscape metaphor, the differential equations describe the motion 
of the ball rolling over a landscape. 
In some cases, the approximation provided by the selection dynamics will  suffice  for 
an analysis of long-run behaviour. This may not be the case,  however, if  these dynamics 
lead to  a  valley  with  a flat floor. If  the valley  completely  encloses  a floor of  equivalent 
points, then we need proceed no further,  but we must carefully consider the behaviour of 
the system  in the valley if  one end hangs above another valley. 
We  respond by  adding a drift term to the selection dynamics. We  view  this as con- 
structing a more detailed approximation of the underlying stochastic process, incorporat- 
ing additional considerations into the model that were thought  to  be insignificant, and 
hence were excluded, when constructing the selection dynamic, but which  have turned out 
to be important. Sections 3-4  present an example  in  which drift is crucial in  assessing the 
outcomes of the learning process. The different points on the floor of the hanging valley 
in this example correspond to different actions at  an information set that is not reached 
in the course of equilibrium play. If drift pushes the players toward actions at this infor- 
mation set that  are compatible with the equilibrium, and hence pushes the system toward 
states that  are  contained within the equilibrium component, then drift can stabilize the 
equilibrium. Alternatively, if drift pushes players toward actions that  are  inconsistent with 
the equilibrium, then the system can fall off the edge of the equilibrium component and 
selection pressures can arise that lead to  other equilibria. 
Section 5 generalizes this intuition to establish a sufficient condition for  a component 
of equilibria to be  stable in  the face of  drift. Any pure-strategy equilibrium, with  the 
property  that  a  strict best response is  played  at every information  set that  is  reached 
under equilibrium play, can potentially be stabilized by drift. We can break our sufficient 
condition into two parts, one addressing drift within the actions corresponding to particu- 
lar information sets and one addressing relat.ive rates of drift across information sets. At 
a given unreached information set, the drift must be compatible with the equilibrium, in 
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equilibrium strategies to be  best  replies.  Across information sets, drift at unreached infor- 
mation sets must be  sufficiently strong relative to drift at information sets that  are  actually 
reached. 
The  former drift condition is more likely to be  satisfied  the larger is the component 
of states corresponding to  an  equilibrium. Hence, drift is unlikely to stabilize equilibria 
that impose quite specific, extreme requirements about play at unreached information sets. 
In the extreme, drift has virtually no  chance  of  stabilizing an equilibrium with  an un- 
reached  information  set at which the set  of  actions compatible with the equilibrium has 
no interior. 
Our willingness to work with the latter drift condition reflects a belief that players  in 
a game are likely to devote considerable resources to analysing and  making decisions that 
matter,  but  pay  little attention  to  decisions that  do  not matter. At  information  sets that 
are reached, the selection dynamics are thus likely to be a  good description of behaviour 
and drift is  likely  to be unimportant, while behaviour will  be  much  more susceptible to 
drift at unreached  information sets. The extent to which drift must be  relatively larger at 
unreached  information  sets, in  order  to stabilize  an equilibrium, varies  from game  to 
game.  Our theoretical analysis avoids this issue  by  allowing  relative  drift levels to become 
arbitrarily  sensitive to potential payoffs, but  our  results are clearly  less  likely  to hold in 
situations where drift is generated by  background noise that has  nothing  to  do with the 
game. 
The finding that drift can be important  might  appear  to  be a  death  knell for empirical 
applications of  game theory. How  can  we hope to make use  of a theory whose implications 
depend  upon  the  details of  an arbitrarily  small drift  process?  Section  6  offers  several 
examples that illustrate the forward  and  backward induction implications of drift. Build- 
ing on  our  examples,  Section  7 suggests that we  might exploit the properties of drift to 
derive testable predictions from game-theoretic models. Far from being the end of empiri- 
cal applications, we  have hopes that an  understanding  of drift may  provide the key  to 
such  work. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
We  consider an n-player  extensive  game  G of  perfect  recall.  Simultaneous-move games 
are  an  important  special  case.  Members of n subpopulations  are  repeatedly matched to 
play the game.  We  speak of “players” when referring to the game G, and “agents” when 
referring to the members of the populations in the evolutionary model. 
Each  agent is characterized by  a  pure  strategy in the pure  reduced  normal form 
(Mailath,  et  al.  (1993)) of  G. A population state identifies the fraction of agents playing 
each of the pure strategies available to each subpopulation. 
We shall identify a strategy in  terms of the actions it specifies at each information 
set. Let Hi  be  the  set  of  player  i’s  information sets and  A(h) the  actions available at 
information set h. If no  other  information  set for player i precedes h€ Hi,  then the state 
zh is a  nonnegative  vector of  dimension  IA(h)l  whose  elements  identify  the fraction  of 
agents in subpopulation i playing  each  of  the IA(h)l pure actions available at h (with the 
elements  of  zh summing to one).2 A state zi  for  subpopulation  i is a vector summarizing 
2.  If he Hi  is  preceded  by  an  information  set  for  player  i,  then  zh is  a  nonnegative  vector  of dimension 
IA(h)l whose  elements  identify  the  fraction  of agents in subpopulation  i whose strategies do not preclude reaching 
h and  who  play  each  of the IA(h)l pure actions  available  at  h (with  the  sum  of zh)s  elements  being  less  than  or 
equal to one, where  the  residual  is  the  proportion  of subpopulation i playing  strategies  that  preclude  h). We 
confine  the  treatment of this  case to footnotes to avoid  obscuring  the  important  issues. BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  367 
the state at each  of  player i’s information sets. A population state z of the entire system 
is a vector summarizing the state of each information set for each subpopulation. Let Zh, 
Zi,  and 2 denote the set of states in each case. 
The  deterministic  dynamics.  Let z(t)  be the population  state at time t. As the game 
is played, agents adjust their strategies. A formal model of  this process will  necessarily 
abstract away a host of  perturbing influences to  obtain  an  underlying selection  process 
that drives strategy revisions. It is common to model the selection  process as a determin- 
istic Markov process represented by the differential equation 
dz 
dt 
i  = -  =  f (z). 
We call the vector-valued function f  the selection function and refer to  (l)  as the selection 
dynamic to emphasize the origins of  our  approach  in  biological  models  of natural selec- 
tion.  In  the models of Young (1993) and  Kandori,  Mailath  and  Rob (1993), f models a 
best-response learning process. Fudenberg and Levine (1  995) examine a model in  which f 
is a smoothed form of fictitious play. 
The trajectories of the selection dynamic (1) are studied in the hope that they capture 
the important features of the strategy-selection process  sufficiently well that they approxi- 
mate the trajectories of the true process from which the selection model is abstracted. To 
study the extent to which this approximation is successful, we introduce a new differential 
equation 
dz 
i  = -  = f  (z)  +  g(z). 
dt 
The trajectories of this perturbed selection dynamic provide a better approximation of the 
true trajectories, because of the inclusion of a drift function g capturing small perturbations 
of the strategy-selection process  excluded  from the unperturbed dynamic (1). In biology, 
the vector g summarizes the numerous sources of genetic variation. In  Kandori,  Mailath 
and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), g models random alterations in strategies. In  Fuden- 
berg and Levine  (1995), g captures perturbations of the payoffs. 
If the unperturbed  selection  process  (1:)  is to be  useful  in  predicting the asymptotic 
behaviour of  the  true  adjustment process,  the  trajectories of  (1)  must exhibit the same 
asymptotic behaviour  as those of  the perturbed  process (2), for the case  in  which  g is 
small. We shall find that this criterion often fails to be  satisfied  even  if g is vanishingly 
small. We accordingly conclude that drft sometimes  matters. 
Drift.  How can g matter, even though it may be arbitrarily small and we  allow no 
discontinuities in the model? To discuss this issue, it is  useful  to introduce a distinction 
between  time spans borrowed from the theory of the firm.  As  in Binmore, Samuelson and 
Vaughan (1995), the short run refers to  a  length of time too  short  for  a movement from 
the initial condition to be perceptible. The medium run refers to  a length of time  sufficient 
for  the forces of selection to operate, and hence for z(t)  to  depart from z(O), but not long 
enough for z(t)  to provide much indication of the asymptotic behaviour of the system. To 
simplify discussion of the long run, we  assume that the deterministic processes currently 
under discussion converge. The long run then refers to  a  time large enough for z(t) to 
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We compare  the  unperturbed  and  perturbed selection  processes  by computing their 
respective trajectories z'(t)  and ~~(t),  beginning with the  same initial condition  z'(0) = 
z2(0)  = zo. Using the unperturbed  tiajectory z'(t) to  approximate the perturbed trajectory 
z2(t)  is certainly valid  in the  short  run.  It  is a well-known continuity property of differential 
equations  that  z'(t)  also approximates  z2(t) for any fixed t when g is  sufficiently  small 
(Sanchez (1968)). Small levels  of drift therefore never matter in the medium run. Problems 
arise only in the long run. 
The study of  the asymptotics of z'(t)  and  z2(t)  as t becomes arbitrarily large and g 
becomes vanishingly small, requires taking two limits. Asymptotic predictions obtained 
from the unperturbed process (1) require that g be  allowed  to vanish before studying the 
limit t +CO.  To argue that such a prediction will serve also for the perturbed process (2), 
given that g is  sufficiently small, and hence that z'(t) can be  used  to approximate z2(t) in 
the long run, is to claim that it is  innocent to reverse the order of  limits. Drift  matters 
precisely  when these limits fail to commute. 
Stochastic dynamics.  Section l  'S informational discussion of evolutionary dynamics 
using the landscape metaphor  was  couched in  terms of  small stochastic shocks to the 
system. We have elsewhere emphasized the importance of being realistic about building 
stochastic noise into selection  processes  (Binmore and Samuelson (1993),  Binmore  et al. 
(1993)). How can we  then proceed as if  a real-world stochastic process can be  studied 
with a deterministic model like (2), which we then hope to  approximate by (l)? 
As an example of what we  have in mind, consider a stochastic process  in  which  the 
game is repeatedly played at discrete points in  time, by agents drawn from large butjinite 
subpopulations, each of  size N.  We are then led to a  Markov process of the form3 
z(t + z) = H(z(t)), 
where z(t) is a  random variable representing the  population  state  at time  t, z is the interval 
between  successive periods, and H is a  random function that depends on N, the procedure 
by which agents are matched, the payoffs in the game, the rules by  which  players choose 
their strategies, and all the perturbations  that  one would like to be  negligible  when  N  is 
large and z small. 
Biologists standardly reduce (3) to  a deterministic differential equation like (2) simply 
by  taking expectations, appealing to the law  of  large numbers to justify the procedure 
when N is large. Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan (1  995) study the circumstances under 
which this informal argument can be made to work in the context of a simple one-dimen- 
sional biological model. Appendix I1 confirms that the extension to the more general case 
of this paper creates no  difficultie~.~ 
In this section, we  discuss how the deterministic, continuous-time dynamics (2) can 
provide a useful approximation of  the discrete, stochastic process (3), as long as we  are 
interested in large subpopulations N (allowing a deterministic approximation) and  short 
time periods z (allowing a continuous-time approximation). We  confine  our  attention  to 
a class of Markov processes satisfying (3) that is described in Appendix 11, which proves 
the following. For any Jixed time t, the solution z3(t) of a stochastic process in this class 
3. The  Markov  assumption  is strong, potentially calling for players to abandon large amounts of  pre- 
viously-collected information  in order to concentrate on their current observation, but we leave its relaxation 
for  future research. 
4. Appendix I1 corrects an error in the proof of Binmore et al. (1995). BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  369 
is approximated with probabilityp arbitrarily close to  1  by the solution z2(t)  of a determin- 
istic process of the form (2), provided that (N,  z) +(GO,  0) so that N2z+0.  It suffices for 
N2r-+0 if the limit z+O  is taken first and N+co  second. 
Because this result sounds like the continuity property we  quoted  to justify ignoring 
drift in the medium run,  it  is important  to  be clear on how it helps  when  studying the 
stochastic process (3). First solve the deterministic differential equation (2). Next, deter- 
mine the asymptotic behaviour of the solution z2(t).  If z2(t)  -+z*  as t +GO,  then the state 
z* serves as  a  high-probability prediction of  the first Nash equilibrium of the game that 
will  be  approached  by  the random variable z3(t),  provided  N  is  large and  z and N2z 
are small.’ The asymptotics of  the perturbed  selection dynamic (2) thus predict the first 
equilibrium visited by the  Markov process (3) with high probability. However, the asymp- 
totic behaviour  of  (2) does not predict the asymptotic behaviour  of  (3).  To make this 
distinction clear, we introduce a  further time span-the  ultralong run. 
The long run is enough time for  a  Markov  process (3), with appropriately large N 
and small z,  to  approach  a  rest point z*  of  (2) with  high  probability.6 The system will 
then linger near z* for  a long time.  But unlike the deterministic dynamic given  by  (2), the 
Markov process will  not  remain near  z*  forever. Given long enough, some perturbing 
shock that is highly  unlikely  in  any small  time  interval will eventually occur. If  it occurs 
at time t’, it will bounce the system to  a  state  z3(t’) that is not contained in the basin of 
attraction of  z*. We can then solve the deterministic dynamic (2) with initial condition 
~’(0)  = z’(t’)  to  obtain  a  high-probability prediction of the subsequent behaviour of  the 
Markov process (3), including the next equilibrium W* in  whose neighbourhood z’(t) will 
’  linger. Given enough time, further such shocks will occur, causing z3(t)  to visit  all  of the 
population states in 2,  pausing at rest points like z* and W*, and rushing past other states 
in its passage between them. In the ultralong run, a probability distribution over 2 will  be 
established that describes the likelihood that z’(t)  will  be  found in any particular region 
of 2 at a large enough time. This limiting distribution assigns a negligible probability to 
regions not containing a rest point of 
In brief, z2(t)  summarizes the high-probability deterministic predictions that can be 
made about z’(t)  given the initial condition zo. Because events that occur only with low 
probability in short time periods must eventually occur with high probability before some 
large enough time t’,  z2(t)  cannot successfully predict the behaviour of z’(t)  after time t’. 
Hence, z2(t) only predicts the behaviour  of  the  Markov process (3)  over a finite time 
period. The asymptotic behaviour of the deterministic dynamic (2) is used to predict the 
behaviour of the  Markov  process (3) in an interval [t”,  t”’],  where t”  is  sufficiently large 
to ensure that z2(t)  is  close to a rest point z*, and t”’  (with t” < t”’  t’) is chosen to ensure 
that only small perturbations occur with significant probability in [t”, t”’].  As N+Go, t” 
remains bounded while t”’+  CO. 
Equilibrium selection  criteria.  We  now  have two equilibrium selection  criteria-the 
history-independent  distribution  to  which  the  Markov  process  (3)  converges  in  the 
5. To see this, choose t, N and z such that (Iz2(t)  -z*ll  <$E and llz3(t)  -z2(t)ll <$E with probability at least 
1  -E. Then llz3(t)  -z*ll  <E with probability at least 1  -E. 
6. It is important  to remember that we  are restricting attention  to processes  whose  approximating deter- 
ministic dynamics  converge. 
7. The achievement of Kandori,  Mailath  and  Rob  (1993) and  Young  (1993)  was  to find  cases  in  which 
high probability is attached only to regions that  contain  a particular equilibrium 2. They  say  that 2 is  selected 
in the long run. We  say instead that 2 is  selected  in  the  ultralong  run. 370  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
ultralong  run,  and  the  history-dependent state z*  to which the approximating determin- 
istic differential equation converges.*  Which is relevant is a  matter  of  the time available 
for  the system to converge. 
Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan (1995) study the expected waiting time to reach 
the  ultralong-run  distribution  in a simple 2 X 2 game. Using the best-response dynamics 
of Kandori,  Mailath  and  Rob (1993) and Young (1993), the expected waiting times are 
stupendously large for plausible parameter values.'  Models in  which  agents' choices are 
stochastic offer the system more opportunities  to climb out of  basins of  attraction  that 
are  not selected  in the  long  run,  and  reduce the expected waiting time to several thousand 
periods, though  the  waiting time still grows explosively  in  the  population  size. Young 
(1997) has followed Ellison (1  993)  in  exploiting the speeding-up effects of local interaction 
effects  in  his model. Araki and Low  (1997)  have done the same for  the model of Binmore, 
Samuelson and Vaughan (1995). Their simulations yield expected waiting times that might 
realistically be  achieved  in  laboratories. We therefore do not discount the possibility that 
ultralong-run selection may be important in some practical contexts. But we  believe that 
long-run equilibrium selection results will frequently be more relevant in applied work. 
Properties of the dynamics.  If we  are  to  examine the long-run, when can we  ignore 
drift  and  work with the simpler unperturbed selection dynamic (1) rather  than  the  per- 
turbed dynamic (2)? We  begin  by  making four assumptions about  the  unperturbed  and 
perturbed deterministic dynamic processes  (1) and (2). 
Assumption  1.  The selection and drift functions f  and g are Lipschitz continuous. 
This ensures that  the  processes  (1)  and (2) each have a unique solution z(t,  2')  for 
each time t>=  0 and each initial condition zo [Hale (1969), p. 181."  Lipschitz continuity is 
not  necessary  for this conclusion, but  it is  a  standard  assumption  that is  satisfied by 
common examples like the replicator dynamics. Our basic results continue to hold without 
this assumption as long as (1) and (2) have unique solutions, though some of  the state- 
ments and arguments become more tedious. However, we  would  like  to stress that the 
(ordinary) continuity off and g plays an  important role in our analysis, apart from issues 
of existence. Adjustment processes like the  pure best-response dynamics, that can respond 
dramatically  even to arbitrarily small payoff  differences,  are  not  continuous  and hence 
are excluded, but we consider continuous processes to be more realistic. 
Assumption 2.  For each t 20,  the solutions to the  unperturbed  and  perturbed selec- 
tion  dynamics are  population  states, meaning that  the  proportions  of  a  subpopulation 
playing the available strategies are nonnegative and sum to one. 
Let nhk(Z) -  nhp(Z) denote the expected change in  payoff if  a randomly chosen mem- 
ber of subpopulation i, whose strategy allows information set h€ Hi to be reached, chooses 
action k~ A(h) instead of VE  A(h) at information set h€ Hi,  given the behavior specified 
by  state z  (including the agent's choices at other information  sets). We assume that the 
8. We  say  that z* is history-dependent because it depends on  the initial condition zo. 
9.  Sandholm and Pauzner  (1997) show that even moderate  amounts of  population  growth make these 
long waiting times infinite. Robles (1996) reaches a similar conclusion. 
10.  Iff  and g satisfy Lipschitz continuity or  the weaker condition of local Lipschitz continuity, then it is 
straightforward (because 2  is convex) to  extendfand g to locally Lipschitz functions on an open set containing 
2.  The result then follows from Theorems 1.1, 2.1,  and 3.1 of Hale [(  1969), ch. l]. BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  37 l 
selection mechanism, restricted to each information  set, is regular and monotonic  (cf. 
Samuelson and  Zhang (1992)): 
Assumption 3. 
(3.1)  Regularity.  For each player i, information set h€ Hi  and action kE A(h), the 
(3.2)  Monotonicity.  For each player i and information set he Hi,  growth rates are 
growth rate fhk/Zhk  is continuous on the state space 2." 
monotonic in the sense that,  for actions k and k'  in A(h) and  state ZE  2, 
hdZ)  =. hk'  (z) 
zhk  ZhK 
nhk(Z)-zhk'(Z)20  @ --p-  - 
Monotonicity ensures that the proportion of a population playing a relatively high- 
payoff action grows faster than the proportion playing a relatively  low-payoff  action.12 
In many biological  models of mutation as well as in the models of Young (1993) and 
Kandori,  Mailath  and Rob (1993), the drift function g does not depend on payoffs at all. 
We  think it more appropriate in economic contexts to follow Myerson's (1978) proper 
equilibrium in modeling more costly mistakes as being  less  likely  to be made. However, 
we  do not view  agents as making detailed calculations of  the costs of  making various 
mistakes, as such agents would  have then calculated enough to avoid making mistakes at 
all. Instead, we believe that people ordinarily make many decisions simultaneously, only 
a fraction of which can be analysed carefully. Most decisions are made by  applying rules- 
of-thumb  that  agents have  become  accustomed to using  in  what  appear  to  be  similar 
circumstances, but which  may not be suited to the problem at hand. These appear in our 
model as drift. The larger are the payoff consequences of  a decision, the more likely  is 
the decision to command an agent's analytical resources, and hence the less important 
will  be  drift.13  To capture this idea, we  assume that players'  behaviour is  related to  a 
measure Ah of the potential cost of  making a mistake at the information  set h.14 As in 
Binmore, Gale  and  Samuelson [9], the results would remain unchanged if  we  used other 
measures of payoff dispersion, but we  concentrate on the difference  between  the largest 
and smallest  expected payoffs because this seems  simplest 
Ah(4 = nwc  (4  -  %zk'(Z), 
where ke  A(h)  and k'~  A(h)  maximize nhk(z)  -  zW(z). For an information set h€ Hi  pre- 
ceded by no  other information set for player i, we then assume:15 
Assumption 4.  The vector  g,  of drift  terms associated with  the  actions  kE A(h) 
satisfies 
g&)  = 77(Ah(Z>>(0h  -Zd,  (4) 
where eh  is a fixed  state in the interior of  Zh  and q:  R+-+R+ is decreasing and Lipschitz 
continuous. 
11. In particular, finite limits of the growth rates exist at the boundaries of the state space, where some 
population proportions are zero. 
12. The rate at which the proportion playing action k at information set h= Hi  grows may depend upon 
the choices made by  agents in population  i at other information sets in Hi,  but the direction of the learning at 
h must reflect payoff differences at h. 
13. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) similarly  suggest  that players will  be  more likely to make mistakes or 
experiment when payoff implications are small. 
14. Our debt to Myerson lies  in making A,, a function of the vector nh(z)  of payoffs to each action available 
at h in state z. 
15. If h is preceded  by  another of player  i's  information sets, then gh(z)  = q(Ah(z))(Zh(z)(&  -zh)), where 
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The  state  eh is to be interpreted as a parameter determined by  the characteristics of 
the  subpopulations  from  which the agents are  drawn.  When the agents are distracted from 
the game at  hand,  or  make  a  mistake for some other reason,  Oh  is  the expectation of 
the distribution  of  proportions  of  each subpopulation  that  takes a  particular  action at 
information set h. For example, agents may  be accustomed to resolving bargaining prob- 
lems by coordinating  on  the fifty/fifty outcome. When faced with the Ultimatum Game, 
they may  not  immediately take  proper  account  of  its unusual  strategic structure,  but 
simply apply the fifty/fifty rule of thumb instead. Such a tendency would  be  reflected  in 
the specification of  eh. 
The assumption that  Oh  lies  in  the interior of Zh  ensures that drift can always  inject 
strategies that  are  currently not played  in  the population,  and  hence tends to carry the 
state z  away from the  boundary.  This formulation is justified if  there is always some 
chance  that  each  strategy  might  be  played, and hence each state in  Zh realized, as a 
consequence of agents making mistakes. 
We do  not  argue that Assumption 4 is plausible as a qualitative description of  the 
drift likely to occur in all contexts. On the contrary, different drift conditions are likely 
to  operate  in different circumstances and one must tailor  the assumptions made about 
drift  to  the application in hand.  For example, potential entrants in the Chain-Store Game 
of Section 3 might be inclined to experiment more  than incumbents, or might devote more 
attention  to their decision, leading them to experience either more or less drift. We would 
capture  this by  generalizing Assumption  4 to allow different  functions for different 
subpopulations. But as long as drift levels are sufficiently  sensitive to payoffs, our results 
continue  to  hold. 
3. WHY DRIFT MATTERS 
Although small drift terms can have no significant  effect  in the medium run, they matter 
in the long run whenever  (1)  and (2) have different asymptotics. This section uses  the 
Chain-Store  Game  to  illustrate this possibility. We choose this game  because  textbooks 
commonly use the same example to justify subgame-perfect equilibria. 
The  Chain-Store  Game.  Figure  1.1  shows  the  extensive form  of  Selten's  (1978) 
Chain-Store Game. Player 1 moves first, choosing to  enter  (E)  a  market  or  not  (N).  If 
player  1 enters, player 2 can acquiesce (A)  or resist entry (R).  The payoffs satisfy the 
inequalities a > e > c, so that the entrant prefers to enter if  the chain store acquiesces but 
prefers to stay out if the chain store resists. They also satisfy b > d, so that the chain store 
prefers acquiescing to resisting. 
Figure 1.2 shows a phase diagram for  an  unperturbed dynamic. Any regular, mono- 
tonic dynamic gives a phase diagram with the same qualitative features. The horizontal 
axis measures the  proportion  of agents in population  2  playing R  while the vertical  axis 
measures the  proportion  of  population  1  agents playing N. We  can  see  two  types of 
equilibria in Figure 1.2. There is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (denoted by S)  in  which 
player 1 enters and 2 acquiesces. There is also a component of Nash equilibria (denoted 
by M')  that  are  not subgame perfect, in  which player 1 does not  enter  and player 2 resists 
entry with probability at least (a -  e)/(a  -c). Depending on the initial state, the dynamics 
will  converge either  to  the  subgame-perfect equilibrium,  or  to  the  Nash  equilibrium 
component X.  The subgame-perfect equilibrium is asymptotically stable, but the Nash 
equilibria are  not.  In  terms of  the landscape metaphor, X is  the bottom of  a hanging 
valley, the left end of which opens into  a pit with S at the bottom. BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  373 
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How does M’  fare when faced with perturbations caused by factors excluded from 
the model that led to the unperturbed selection dynamic? In the long run, these pertur- 
bations  appear  in the form of drift. Figure  1 shows two specifications of drift, and the 
corresponding phase diagrams  for the Chain-Store Game.  In each case, drift causes agents 
to choose randomly between their two strategies, with equal probability attached  to each 
strategy (i.e. 8 attaches probability  $ to each strategy at each information  set). Figures 
1.3-1.4  illustrate the case when  77  of Assumption 4 is constant. Agents are then equally 
prone  to  drift in  every  state. In this case, the addition of drift yields a system that has a 
unique,  asymptotically stable state  that  attracts  the entire space and which is  approxi- 
mately the subgame-perfect equilibrium.16 
Near  the  top of the state space, the payoffs to player 2’s two strategies are virtually 
identical. We would accordingly expect player 2 to be more subject to drift near the top 
of the state space. Figure 1.5 shows the state space for such a drift process, which corre- 
sponds  to  making  77  of  Assumption 4 strictly  decreasing, with the corresponding phase 
diagram shown in Figure  1.6.17 There are now two asymptotically stable states. One of 
these (denoted by 6)  is approximately a Nash equilibrium that is not subgame perfect. In 
this case, drift stabilizes the system  in the middle of a hanging valley. Different specifica- 
tions of drift can thus give  rise to different long-run behavior. 
Drift  and  the  medium  run.  Section 2 discusses  how  the long-run behaviour of  the 
stochastic process (2) is  approximated with high probability  by  the asymptotics of  the 
perturbed differential equation (2). The asymptotics of the unperturbed deterministic pro- 
cess  (1)  sometimes provide an analogous medium-run approximation. 
To illustrate this point, consider a specification of drift in the Chain-Store Game  that 
fails to stabilize the perturbed  dynamic in the hanging valley ,M’, as in Figures 1.3-1.4. 
The  subgame-perfect equilibrium  S  will  then  be  our long-run  prediction  for z’(t),  the 
underlying stochastic process. Suppose, however, that the initial condition zo lies  in  the 
basin of attraction, relative to the unperturbed dynamic (given  by  (l)), of an equilibrium 
v* E .K.  Then the  unperturbed dynamic, z’(t), approaches  v* as t -+CO.  If the drift term is 
sufficiently small, the  perturbed  dynamic, z’(t), will also initially approach  v*.  As z’(t) 
approaches .A”, the selection term f  (z)  becomes small, since this selection term is zero on 
the set of equilibria K.  The forces of selection will then eventually be dominated by those 
of drift. We have assumed that in the long run,  drift will push the system  away from I  4” 
to the subgame perfect equilibrium S. But if  drift is small, z’(t)  will move  away  from  v* 
very  slowly.  The same is therefore true with high probability of z3(t),  and the medium- 
run behaviour of z3(t)  thus calls for  the system to approach v* and then slowly drift away. 
In some cases, z’(t)  may linger so long in the vicinity  of  v*  that only the medium-run 
behaviour is  of  practical relevance, and this medium-run behaviour is captured by  z1  (t) 
as well as z’(t), allowing us to work with the  unperturbed dynamic. In other cases, it will 
be essential to examine long-run behaviour, and hence to work with the perturbed process 
z’(t)  that  incorporates  drift. 
Do we  need  dynamics?  Our analysis is capable of stabilizing Nash equilibria in the 
hanging valley ,M-  if the  drift  has appropriate properties. These equilibria are  not subgame 
16. “Approximately”  is needed here because the inward-pointing drift prevents exact convergence to the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
17.  Because player 2 is relatively prone to drift near the top of the state space, the drift trajectories near 
.;f  ’  have flattened, causing relatively rapid movements in player 2’s  strategies toward  the fifty/fifty mixture 
specified  by  8.  The trajectories are quite steep near those states at which R  is played  with  probability i,  where 
the payoff to player l’s strategies are virtually identical and hence player 1 is relatively subject to drift. BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  375 
perfect  because  they  involve  the use of the strategy R, which is an inferior reply at the 
incumbent’s information  set. How does this  result compare with  the  orthodox  game- 
theoretic approach, in  which  the stability of equilibria is studied by  introducing pertur- 
bations in the payoffs or strategies of the game? With the exception of Fudenberg, Kreps 
and Levine (1 988)”,  such orthodox analyses destabilize equilibria, like those in the compo- 
nent containing (N,  R), that sit  in a hanging valley  which  calls  for  an inferior reply to be 
chosen at  an  unreached information  set. Which stability analysis should command our 
attention? Samuelson (1994)  examines  a setting in  which the trembles of orthodox stability 
analysis need to be  infinitely large compared with perturbations in the equilibrating pro- 
cess before their effect  becomes  significant. 
4.  WHEN  CAN  DRIFT  BE  IGNORED? 
Having shown that drift can matter, the question arises:  when can the problems raised by 
drift safely  be  neglected? 
If z* is a hyperbolic stationary  state of the unperturbed selection  process (l),  then the 
perturbed selection  process  (2) has a rest point close to z*.19 The latter rest point moves 
arbitrarily close to z* as the drift term becomes arbitrarily small, and has the same stability 
properties  as z*  (Hirsch and  Smale  [(1974),  Theorems  1-2,  p. 3051).  Hence, if  we  are 
working with hyperbolic rest points of i  =  f(z),  then we  can ignore drift. The rest points 
of  i  =  f(z)  provide approximate  information  about the rest points  of  i  = f+  g  that lie 
nearby and are of the same type. The approximation becomes arbitrarily sharp as g gets 
small. Nonhyperbolic rest points, however, do not have this “structural stability.’’ The 
addition  of  arbitrarily  small drift terms to the equation i  =  f(z)  can completely change 
the nature of a nonhyperbolic rest point. 
It is  often said that almost all dynamic systems  have  only  hyperbolic rest points.20 
Many  mathematicians  and physicists therefore  ignore the possibility  of  nonhyperbolic 
rest points when working with similar dynamic systems. However, the economics  of  the 
applications to which learning models are applied usually force us to  confront nonhyper- 
bolic  rest  points.  For example, the equilibria in the component  of  the Chain-Store 
Game  are  not  hyperbolic. This is not exceptional. Any Nash equilibrium that specifies a 
path which does not reach every information set  (excluding  some  games  featuring fortu- 
itous payoff ties)  fails  to be isolated, and hence  fails  to be  hyperbolic, under all  of  the 
familiar selection dynamics. 
We might try to respond by shifting the focus of our analysis to components of rest 
points, seeking components that satisfy a set-valued notion of  asymptotic stability such 
as that offered by  Bhatia and Szego  [(1970),  Def. 1  S,  p.  Since the Nash equilibria 
18.  They  stabilize all Nash equilibria by  allowing the players’ knowledge of the rules of the game or their 
own payoffs to tremble. 
19.  A stationary  state  or rest point of a differential equation is hyperbolic if  the Jacobian matrix of the 
differential equation, evaluated at the rest point, exists and has no eigenvalues with zero real parts. Hyperbolic 
rest points are isolated and are either sources, saddles or sinks (Hirsch and Smale [(1974),  ch. 91). Nonhyperbolic 
rest points need not be isolated and isolated rest points need not be hyperbolic. 
20.  The Peoxito theorem (Hirsch and Smale [(1974), p. 3141)  shows that for two-dimensional systems, 
there is a precise  sense  in  which “almost all” dynamic systems  have only hyperbolic rest points. A similar result 
holds in higher dimensions for certain classes  of  dynamic systems, such as linear and gradient systems (Hirsch 
and Smale, pp. 313-315). 
21.  Ritzberger and Weibull  (1995), Schlag (1993) and Swinkels  (1993) examine components that satisfy a 
set  version  of  asymptotic stability. A similar motivation but different techniques appear in Ritzberger (1993), 
who introduces the idea of an essential component, where (very roughly) a component is essential if  all nearby 
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in a component like <K  in the Chain-Store Game often specify the same path  through the 
tree, differing only  in the details of what happens off the equilibrium path, there is often 
no loss of information in treating components as a single entity. This approach is adequate 
when the component of  rest points constitutes the flat floor of  a pit in the evolutionary 
landscape. Drift will then be irrelevant, since we  do not care where it takes us on the floor 
of the pit. But the Chain-Store Game of Figure 1 shows that we  must often expect our 
components of rest points to form the floor of a hanging valley  whose  equilibria can be 
stabilized by  some types of drift  and  destabilized by  others. Drift then may or may not 
push the system over the cliff, and  cannot be ignored. 
5. WHEN  DRIFT  MATTERS 
Section 3 shows that drift can stabilize a  Nash  equilibrium in the hanging valley ,A’”  of 
the Chain-Store Game. If  z*  is a  Nash equilibrium in a general game, this section  defines 
the  notion  of  z*-compatible drift to provide a criterion that ensures stability for some 
Nash equilibrium W*  that lies on the floor of the same valley as z*. 
A  Nash equilibrium z*  is a strict-path equilibrium if, at every information set  reached 
with positive probability  under z*, the action prescribed by  z*  is a strict best response. 
Notice that  the  strategies that  support  such an equilibrium need not be pure, since  mix- 
tures are allowed  off  the equilibrium path, though no mixtures can occur on the equilib- 
rium path.22  For generic extensive-form games,  all pure-strategy equilibria are strict-path 
equilibria.  Figure  5 below contains  a  game  with  a pure-strategy  but  not  a  strict-path 
equilibrium. 
We could apply similar techniques to  Nash  equilibria that allow mixtures along the 
equilibrium path,  but  postpone  such an inquiry for  future  work. Mixed equilibria raise 
new  analytical complications because many monotonic selection  processes  cannot con- 
verge to mixed equilibria. For example, mixed equilibria are centers for common versions 
of the replicator dynamics.23 
If z*  is a  strict-path equilibrium, let c(.*)  c  2  be the set of Nash equilibria specifying 
the same path of  play as z*.*~  We  refer to  <(z*)  as a comrnon-path set of  equilibria and 
refer to the path of  play itself as a strict path. Because the equilibria in  @*) have the 
same path of play, they have the same collection of information sets that  are reached  with 
probability zero. 
Let z*  be a  strict-path equilibrium. We say that the specification of drift is z*-compat- 
ible if  we  can find an equilibrium W*, in the relative interior of the common-path set of 
equilibria c(z*) and hence  giving  the same path of play as z*, with the property that  W* 
attaches  the action eh  of Assumption 4 to each information set h that is reached with zero 
probability under equilibrium z*, but is not precluded by previous choices of  the player 
22.  This concept differs from simply applying quasi-strictness in the pure reduced normal form in that  a 
strict-path equilibrium allows no mixtures along the equilibrium path, unlike a quasi-strict equilibrium. However, 
a quasi-strict equilibrium induces mixtures off the equilibrium path that have full support  on the set  of available 
actions, in order to satisfy the condition that the equilibrium contains every pure-strategy best response within 
its support, while a strict-path equilibrium does not impose such a requirement. 
23.  Fudenberg and Levine  (1993a,  b)  direct attention to self-conjirming equilibria in extensive-form games, 
the study of which we also postpone. 
24.  As in the less formal introductory sections we  speak interchangeably of  Nash equilibrium strategy 
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who moves at h.25 If a z*-compatible drift process  were the only force acting at  an infor- 
mation set h that is unreached under equilibrium z*, then it would converge to the actions 
given  by  eh at information  set  h, which  would  support  the  outcome  z*  as  a  Nash 
equilibrium. 
The Chain-Store Game shows that we  must pay attention  to  the sensitivity of drift 
levels to payoff  differences.  To examine this question, we parameterize the function q of 
Assumption 4. Replacing q by q, for n = 1,2, . . . ,  we can then study comparative statics 
questions by  observing the result  of  varying n in the corresponding drift function g,.  In 
addition to the requirements of Assumption 4, we  require: 
Assumption 5. 
For a fixed  8, higher values of  n then correspond to drift that is more payoff-sensitive. 
The function q,(A)  = e-"'  satisfies  these assumptions. 
A drift  function g, is  z*-compatible if,  and  only  if,  the same is  true  of  gl. It is 
therefore meaningful to speak of  drift being z*-compatible without specifying the value 
of the parameter n. In  addition, if drift is compatible with one element of a  common-path 
set  of  equilibria corresponding  to  a  single  outcome, then  it  is  compatible with  every 
element of that set. 
It does not follow from z*-compatibility that z* itself  is the limit of rest points of the 
perturbed dynamic as n 303,  but the following proposition, proved in Appendix I, indi- 
cates that something similar must be true  for  at least one equilibrium W*  with the same 
strict path. 
Dejinition 1.  An equilibrium W*  is stabilized by  drift if, for any neighbourhood  V 
containing W*, there exists an integer n( V)  such that  for any specification of drift  that  is 
at least as sensitive to payoffs as  i.e.  for any n >  n( V),  V contains  two further 
neighbourhoods B and U,,  such that, 
(1.1) any trajectory of the perturbed dynamic that begins  in B remains in  V, eventu- 
ally enters U,,  and never subsequently leaves U,; 
(1.2)  W*€  U,cBc V; 
(1.3)  U, shrinks to W*  as n-+ CO. 
Proposition l.  Let drift  be compatible with a  strict-path  equilibrium z*. Then there 
exists an equilibrium W*  with the  same  strict path as z*  that is stabilized by  drift. 
Proposition  1  shows that z*-compatibility provides a criterion for drift to create a 
stable rest point on the floor of a hanging valley  when drift is  sufficiently  payoff-sensitive. 
We shall often find it convenient to say that the payoff path corresponding to z* and W* 
is stabilized by such drift. In all the examples we  have computed, the neighbourhood  U, 
contains only one rest point of the perturbed dynamics, which  is  asymptotically stable. 
25.  The equilibrium W*  is  in  the relative interior of c(.*)  if  the actions prescribed by  W*  at each nonpre- 
cluded information set reached with probability zero under z* and W*  lie  in  the interior (relative to the product 
of the Zh's corresponding to these information sets) of the set of actions consistent with z* and W*  being Nash 
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Proposition  l holds for  arbitrarily  small drift levels,  since  we can replace g, by  Ag,, 
for  any sufficiently small A, without affecting the conclusion. What is crucial is that n be 
sufficiently large, so that  drift levels are sufficiently  sensitive to payoff differences. 
6.  EXAMPLES 
This section uses the results of Proposition  1 to examine several games that have become 
standard in thinking about backward and forward induction. Our conclusion is that the 
perturbed dynamic process may stabilize outcomes that fail to satisfy backward and for- 
ward induction properties. In each example, the common-path set of equilibria is a compo- 
nent of equilibria in the  standard sense. 
Backward  induction.  We  first  return to the Chain-Store Game of Figure 1.  Let  z* 
be a  Nash equilibrium in  which the  entrant does not enter, so that z* is an element of the 
component cK.  Then z* must specify that  the  incumbent resist entry with probability at 
least  (a -  e)/(a  -c)  = Y*.  Drift  is  z*-compatible if, and only if,  0, >  r*, where  0,  is  the 
probability  with  which  drift  induces  a  member  of  population  2  to  resist  entry.  For 
example, if  r* < i and 0, = $,  so that drift prompts members of population  2 to choose 
between their two strategies with equal likelihood, while entry is unprofitable if  only a 
minority of incumbents resist entry, then drift is z*-compatible. This is the case illustrated 
in Figure  1. Alternatively, if  r* > i,  so entry is unprofitable only if  a majority of incum- 
bents  resist, then  drift  is  z*-compatible only if  drift  incorporates  a  bias in  favour  of 
resisting. Notice that compatibility depends only on the actions of  agent 2. 
If drift is z*-compatible, then we can proceed to the next step. The perturbed process 
will  have  stable outcomes near JT  if  the drift process is  sufficiently  sensitive  to payoffs. 
In Figure  1.3, drift is  not  sensitive to payoffs at all and there is  no such stable state. 
In  Figures  1.5-1.6,  drift is  sufficiently  sensitive  to payoffs, and  the  component .A  '  is 
stabilized. 
Why are  the  relative drift levels induced by payoff differences so important? Figure 
2 shows a detail of the region of the Chain-Store Game's phase diagram near the compo- 
nent ,Ap.  The  arrows represent the direction of the selection process and  the direction of 
the combined drift of the agents in the two subpopulations. Figure 2.1  corresponds to 
Figures  1.3-1.4,  where drift is compatible with  but is not sensitive to payoff  levels. 
The key  here is that the trajectories of  the drift process near -4" create a force pushing 
the  state  to the right that is weaker than  the force of the learning dynamics pushing the 
state  to the left. The state is then pushed ever leftward until it reaches the cliff-edge at the 
end of  the  component  .H and falls into the basin of  attraction of  the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. In terms of our landscape metaphor, drift causes the state  to roll to the end 
of the hanging valley corresponding to  and  fall off a precipice into  a pit whose bottom 
is S. 
In  Figure 2.2, which corresponds to Figures 1.5-1.6,  drift pressures pushing the state 
back into  the basin of attraction of .M' (i.e. to the right) are more powerful than learning 
pressures as long as the  state  is not  too  close to the edge of <N.  Drift now stabilizes the 
state in the middle of  the hanging valley M'.  The heart of  the proof  of Proposition  1 
involves showing that this relationship will  hold  whenever drift  is compatible with  an 
equilibrium and sufficiently  sensitive  to payoffs. Payoff sensitivity ensures that the drift 
near  a  component  M  will  be shaped primarily by the agent whose unreached information 
set creates the equilibrium indifference that gives  rise to the component ,,K.  Compatibility BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  379 
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ensures that the result will  be  a force pushing the system into the basin  of  attraction of 
the component 
Because the ability of drift to stabilize equilibria arises out of the relative directions 
of the drift and learning forces, there is a trade-off between the properties that the drift 
and learning processes must have  in  order  for  drift  to be  effective.  We  have  assumed 
relatively little about the learning process, and then have made strong assumptions about 
relative drift rates at reached  and  unreached  information sets in order to ensure that the 
drift  and  learning dynamics sometimes  have  the relationship shown  in  Figure 2.2.  We 
could  impose  fewer restrictions on the drift process  if we were made stronger assumptions 
about the learning process, requiring learning to be  relatively fast at reached  compared to 
unreached  information sets. 
The first step in evaluating the Chain-Store  Game was to check for compatibility of 
the  drift  process  with  component X.  Notice  that  for  any  fixed  specification  of  drift, 
compatibility is more likely to be  satisfied  the larger is the component X.  This suggests 
that  the perturbed  process  should be  more likely  to lead  to outcomes  near  X  when 
payoffs are chosen so that J is relatively large. This observation forms the basis for  a 
comparative statics investigation discussed  in  Section  7. 
Outside options.  The  shape  of the extensive form of the game in Figure 3 suggests 
that it be  called  the “Dalek  Game”  (Binmore (1987-88)). 
26. We  could formulate  a  geometric version  of  Proposition 1 based on these ideas. Intuitively, suppose 
that, given a  component A’”, we  could find a subset X*  with the  property  that  the  drift  process on X*  points 
into  the  basin of attraction of -K*  under  the selection  dynamics. Then  under  the  perturbed  process, all trajector- 
ies beginning in a  neighbourhood of X*  would approach X*.  This result holds for  any  drift  process and hence 
replaces the compatibility and payoff  sensitivity  of  drift in  Proposition 1 with the geometric “pointing  into” 
condition.  Proposition  1 allows us to formulate our result  while working directly with the  game  rather  than  with 
the phase diagram of the  dynamics  and directs attention  to  the role of drift at unreached  information  sets. 380  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
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Dalek  Game 
The  Dalek  Game  has  two  components  of Nash equilibria, including a strict Nash 
equilibrium given  by  (M,  L) with payoffs (9,3) and a  component  X of equilibria with 
payoffs (7,4), in  which  player l takes the outside option (plays T)  and player 2 plays R 
with probability at least 2/9. The  former is a (hyperbolic) sink under regular, monotonic 
dynamics while the stationary states in the latter  component  are  not hyperbolic. 
It is common to argue that forward induction forces us to restrict attention  to  the 
equilibrium (M,  L)  in this game.27  How  does this forward induction argument fare in our 
terms? For  drift  to be compatible with Nash equilibria in the component X,  drift must 
induce player 2 to play  R with probability  greater than 2/9.  If it does, then perturbed 
dynamics  for  which drift is  sufficiently  sensitive  to payoffs will  yield  stable outcomes in 
which player l takes the outside option. 
It is interesting to note that Balkenborg’s (1994) careful experimental investigation 
of the Dalek  Game  finds that the outside option is virtually always chosen. This exper- 
imental result is one of a number which  suggest  that the forward induction criterion has 
little predictive power. From  our point of  view,  its results are mildly encouraging because 
they are consistent with the type of drift  analysed in Proposition  1. Section 7 proposes a 
more telling experiment  capable  of refuting the relevance  of this type of drift to the learn- 
ing behaviour  of  human experimental subjects. 
Burning money.  We consider another  common  forward-induction  example, the gen- 
eral form of  which  is  due  to  van  Damme (1987, 1989) and Ben Porath  and Dekel (1992). 
The Battle-of-the-Sexes  game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed-strat- 
egy  equilibrium.  It is common to dismiss the mixed-strategy equilibrium. How do we 
27. Kohlberg  and  Mertens  (1986),  early  and  forceful  advocates  of forward  induction,  introduced  a  version 
of the  Dalek  game.  To apply  forward  induction,  we  might  appeal to the  iterated  elimination  of weakly  dominated 
strategies. B is  strictly  dominated  for  player  1. Removing B causes R to be  weakly  dominated  for  player 2, the 
removal of which  causes T to be  weakly  dominated  for  player 1, leaving (M,  L).  Alternatively, we could  appeal 
to the  forward  induction  reasoning of van  Damme (1987, 1989)  or to the  normal  form  variant of this  reasoning 
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Burning-Money Game 
choose between  the two pure-strategy equilibria, given that the players have opposing 
preferences over these equilibria? Both equilibria are hyperbolic stationary states, so that 
appealing to drift is no help in this game. 
Suppose that before the game is  played, player  l  has the  option  of  burning  two 
dollars. The payoffs in the larger signaling game that results are shown in Figure 4. Notice 
that if  the money is  burned,  then 2 is  subtracted from player  l’s payoffs. The iterated 
elimination of  weakly dominated  strategies leads to  a  unique outcome for this game of 
(Not, T;  LL),  giving player 1 her preferred payoff. 
The assessment of this game again turns on the issue of compatibility. Consider the 
equilibrium in  which  player  l  burns  the money  and (T,  L) is  then played, yielding the 
payoff pair (2, 1).  Compatibility requires tha.t, at player 2’s right information  set, drift 
induces agents to play R  with a probability exceeding $.  A drift process that introduces 
strategies in equal proportions then cannot stabilize an equilibrium in  which  money is 
burned. 
Consider the equilibrium in  which no money is burned but (B,  R)  is played, yielding 
the payoff pair (1,4). Compatibility requires that, at player 2’s  left information set, R  is 
played with a probability exceeding f . In this case, compatibility appears  to be plausible. 
The  perturbed dynamics may then yield outcomes in  which player 1 burns no money, but 
in  which  the  forward induction argument carries no force and payoffs are  (1,4). 
Incompatible drift.  Not all Nash equilibria yield outcomes that can be stabilized by 
drift. To see that this is the case, consider the  Nash  equilibrium (L,  L) in Figure 5. This 
component  cannot be stabilized because there is no interior to  the set of actions at player 
2’s information set that  are  consistent with the equilibrium, and hence no possibility for 
inward-pointing drift  to be compatible with this equilibrium. 
Cheap talk.  One of the  apparent successes  of evolutionary game theory has been to 
use refinements of the evolutionarily stable strategy concept to examine issues  of  cheap 
talk. Blume, Kim and Sobel (1993), Kim and Sobel (1992), Matsui (199 l), Sobel (1993), 382  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
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Game  with  Nash  equilibrium  that  cannot  be  stabilized 
and Warneryd (1990) establish conditions under which the evolutionary process, operating 
on the cheap talk game, selects  efficient equilibria of the underlying game. To see  why such 
a result might  be  expected, consider an  outcome  in  which  everyone  plays an inefficient 
equilibrium. Let  a strategy appear in  which  some  agents send the currently unused  mess- 
age a  and in  which  all agents play the efficient equilibrium whenever at least one agent 
sends message a.  The resulting dynamics will lead to  an  outcome with  only  the efficient 
equilibrium being played. Two steps are  important in making this argument.  The  first is 
to establish that  an  unused message  exists.  The second, upon which we  shall focus, is to 
ensure that agents react to this message  by,  playing  the efficient equilibrium. The validity 
of both steps can  be seen as raising questions of drift.** 
To consider cheap talk,  we  begin  with  the Stag Hunt Game shown  in  Figure 6.1. 
This  game  has  two  Nash  equilibria, (A,  A)  and (B,  B),  with the former being risk-dominant 
and the latter  payoff-dominant. 
Now  suppose that, before playing the game, player 1  has  an  opportunity  to  announce 
either A or B. We interpret this as  an  announcement of the strategy that the agent claims 
she will play, but the announcement is cheap talk, in the sense that it  imposes  no restric- 
tion on  the action that the player actually takes. The game  with  cheap talk is  then  given 
in Figure 6.2. One  component of pure-strategy Nash equilibria gives  payoffs  (10,  10). This 
component is asymptotically stable, a reflection of  the fact that  10  is  the largest payoff 
available in the game. 
Consider an equilibrium in which  player  1 plays AA (announce A and play  A)  and 
payoffs (8,8) are received. The conventional cheap talk argument now  observes  that if 
player 2’s strategy is AB (respond to announcement A by playing A and  to B by playing 
B), then it is a better reply for player 1 to choose BB, leading to  a payoff  of  (10,lO). The 
analysis is then  completed  with an  argument  as  to why  we  would  expect  player 2  to  be 
playing AB rather  than AA. But the difference  between  AB and AA appears only  off  the 
equilibrium path.  The  plausibility of  AB rather  than  AA therefore depends  on  what  is 
assumed about  drift. 
Let  be the component of equilibria in  which  player  1 chooses AA. Drift at the 
unreached  information  set corresponding to  l’s  announcement  of  B is compatible with 
Nash equilibria in <M’  if  it causes player  2 to choose A  at the left information set  with 
28.  Banerjee  and  Weibull  (1993)  note  that  inefficient  outcomes  can  persist  in  their  evolutionary  model 
with  “discriminating”  players  for  reasons  analogous  to those that  allow  inefficient  outcomes  to  persist  when 
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6.2 
probability at least f . The  perturbed  dynamics  may  therefore give stable outcomes near 
._  1  . Because the announcements  are  cheap  talk, drift can similarly  lead to stable outcomes 
in  which  player  1 announces B  but  plays  A, with  player  A  playing  A  in  response  to 
the announcement of  B  and playing A  at the unreached  information  set  following  an 
announcement of A with probability at least f . 
We therefore consider it unsafe to conclude that evolutionary processes  will  necessar- 
ily  select  efficient  outcomes in cheap talk games. This view  is  to be contrasted with  much 
of the literature on evolutionary processes  in cheap talk games. For example, Sobel(l993) 
rejects a  component  of equilibria if  there is uny realization of the underlying stochastic 
drift process that leads away from the component. This may  be an  appropriate notion for 
an ultralong-run analysis, since the ultralong run is a period of  time long  enough that any 
realization of the process that can happen will happen. For  a long-run analysis,  however, 
drift may  yield  quite different results. 
Cooper,  DeJong,  Forsythe  and  Ross  (1992) conduct  an experimental investigation of 
the Stag Hunt Game  and  a  Cheap  Talk  Game  shown  in  Figure 6. They  find  that in the 
Stag Hunt Game, virtually all  of the players chose action A.  When cheap talk was allowed, 
virtually all of the announcements were strategy B, but strategy A was  still  often played, 
appearing slightly more  than  30%  of  the time. The  latter  result  is  consistent with  our 
observation that  outcomes in  which  A is played can be  stabilized  by drift, though  a  more 
likely  explanation  appears  to  be  that  the  system  has  simply  not  yet  settled  on  an 
eq~ilibrium.~~ 
Cooper,  DeJong,  Forsythe  and  Ross also investigate a  game in  which the two  players 
simultaneously announce either A  or B, and then play the Stag Hunt  Game  of Figure 6. 
Figure 7 presents the normal  form of this game. A strategy in such  a game  is  now a triple, 
29.  For  example,  most of the  cases  in  which A was  played  involved  an  opponent  who  played  B, suggesting 
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Two-sided Cheap  Talk  Game 
such as ABA, interpreted  as  announcing A, playing B if  the  opponent  announces A, and 
playing A  if  the  opponent  announces  B. Behaviour  in  this game differs markedly  from 
the case of  one-sided cheap  talk, with the strategy BBB now  being virtually always  played 
by the experimental subjects. 
This  game  has  a  component  of  equilibria that gives  outcome (B,  B),  for payoffs 
(10,  lO),  that includes every pure strategy combination giving  payoff  (10, 10) and which  is 
asymptotically stable  under  a  deterministic, monotonic dynamic.  This  stability arises out 
of the  fact  that 10  is the largest possible payoff  in the game.  The  game also has  two pure- 
strategy Nash equilibria which produce  the  outcome  (A,  A),  one in  which  both players 
choose  AAA and one in which  both choose  BAA. In  both  cases, announcements  are 
ignored. Neither of these equilibria is a  strict-path equilibrium and neither is stable under 
a deterministic, monotonic dynamic  (much  like  the equilibrium (L,  L) of  Figure  5). If 
strategy AAA is played, for example,  then  it  takes only a  trace of strategy BAB to trigger 
dynamics  that  lead  to  everyone  playing  strategy  BAB for  outcome  (B,  B). No  small 
amount of  drift  can  then  stabilize pure-strategy equilibria in  which  action A  is chosen, 
making it no surprise that  action B is  commonly  observed in the experimental o~tcorne.~' 
7.  PREDICTIONS 
Despite the  Two-sided  Cheap  Talk  Game  and  Figure  5, we  will  typically find components 
with the  property  that  some specifications of drift will stabilize them but  other  specifica- 
tions of drift will not.  The interesting question concerns the likelihood with  which a com- 
ponent will  be  stable. This  appears to be  an impossible question to answer  because  it 
depends  upon  the  specification of a  drift  process about which we  are likely to have little 
information. On the  other  hand,  progress on this question is essential if  we  aspire to a 
theory that will be useful in studying  behaviour,  whether  in  the  laboratory  or in the field. 
We  accordingly  turn  to  the  question of  how  an  understanding  of  the role of  drift can 
provide  the  foundation  for  testable predictions. In particular, we  suggest an experiment 
designed to examine the role of drift in equilibrium selection. The experiment  proceeds  in 
three stages. 
The basic intuition  for  this experiment  emerged  from our discussion of the  Chain- 
Store  Game,  where we noted that drift is more likely to be  compatible  with an equilibrium 
that allows a large set of  out-of-equilibrium behaviours  than  an  equilibrium with  very 
30.  There remains the mixed,  babbling  equilibrium  in  which  players  randomize  between  AAA and BAA. BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  385 
stringent out-of-equilibrium requirements (as in  Figure 5). Our task now  is  to make this 
intuition usefully  precise.  Since  the problem is inherently an exercise  in  comparative  stat- 
ics, the experiment  must involve comparisons of outcomes of  games  that  are similar but 
involve different payoffs. 
The suggested experiment centers around a version  of the Dalek  Game studied exper- 
imentally by  Balkenborg (1994) (Figure 3). Consider the version  of  this game shown in 
Figure 8. The  component  of equilibria supporting the outcome (T,  R)  is relatively large 
when  X is small, and shrinks as X grows. Our  model of drift then leads to the prediction 
that we  should see the outcome (T,  R)  when X is  small  (say  X = 0 or 1) and the outcome 
(M,  L)  when X is large (say X = 6). 
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FIGURE  8 
Game 8-Modified  Dalek  Game 
The equilibria  (T,  R)  and  (M,  L)  in  Figure  8  are  both  subgame  perfect.  We  are 
especially interested in the ability of drift to stabilize Nash equilibria that  are  not  subgame 
perfect. In light  of this, consider the game  in Figure 9. Provided that X >  0, this game  has 
a unique  subgame-perfect  equilibrium (M,  L),  though (T,  R)  remains  a  Nash equilibrium. 
Our prediction is again that the latter equilibrium will appear when X is  relatively  small 
(such as X = 1) and (M,  L) when  X is large (say X = 6). Our suggested initial experiment 
thus involves running  Games 8 and 9 while varying the value  of  X through the suggested 
range of  values. 
These predictions are based on the observation that, when X is  large, the component 
supporting equilibrium (T,  R)  is small, and it  is  accordingly less  likely  that drift will  be 
compatible with this component.  Experimental  outcomes  may match our predictions, and 
yet drift still  be compatible with (T,  R)  when X is large (contrary to  our suggested expla- 
nation),  simply  because  large values  of  X prompt experimental subjects to  adopt  initial 
play that happens to be  in the basin  of attraction of (M,  L),  while  small  values  yield initial 
play  in  the basin of attraction of (T,  R). 
Our suggestion  for addressing this possibility  is  to construct  a  second experiment 
with Games 8-9  in  which  different groups of  subjects  begin  by playing a common game 
whose  payoffs  are gradually allowed to diverge, during the course of repeated play, until 
one  group  plays Game 8 and the other  Game  9. This would ensure that the players cannot 386  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
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condition their initial behaviour  (or their behaviour in the initial few periods) on the value 
of X and hence cannot begin  with  systematically  different initial play. Any  differences  in 
outcomes  could  then  reasonably  be  attributed to  drift influencing the learning process in 
different ways. 
To gain further insight into the role of drift, and pose a more  demanding challenge 
for the theory, we  suggest a  third  experiment  in  which  the human subjects are initially 
matched  not against other subjects but against a computer whose  play  is programmed to 
direct one  group  of subjects to equilibrium (M,  L) and  one  group  of (T,  R), in each of 
Games 8 and 9.31  The  computerized  players would  then be eliminated and the subjects 
matched against each  other.  When  X is  small, both (M,  L)  and (T,  R) are stable outcomes 
of  the perturbed  dynamics,  in  each of  Games 8-9,  and each  group  of  subjects should 
continue to play  the  outcome  established by  its initial conditioning.  When  X  is large, 
however, we expect only (M,  L)  to be stable, and expect (T,  R) to be displaced by  (M,  L) 
in those groups  of subjects who  have initially been conditioned to play (T,  R). 
8.  CONCLUSION 
The ideas behind this paper  are  simple: The criterion for a model to be  successful  is  that 
it include important  factors  and exclude unimportant ones. But how do we know what is 
important  and  what  is not? In the case of evolutionary games, the model itself provides 
some  of  the  answers. If  the  model  produces  stationary  states  that  are  not  hyperbolic 
and  do  not occur in components that satisfy some variation of asymptotic stability, then 
important factors have been  excluded from  the  model  and the latter  should be expanded. 
The factors to be  added to  the model are  important, in the sense that they can have 
a significant impact on the behaviour of the dynamic system, but they also may  be  arbi- 
trarily small  in magnitude. It is presumably  because they are small that they are excluded 
from the model in  the first  analysis. How  can  a model whose behaviour is shaped by 
31.  Binmore  et al. (1993) and  Winter  and  Zamir  (1996)  find  a  similar  conditioning  process  to be  quite 
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arbitrarily small factors be of any use  in  applications? One  conclusion  of  this paper is 
that, while the  factors  themselves  may  be  small, their existence can nevertheless be  used 
to derive experimentally testable predictions that  do  not  depend upon observing arbitrarily 
small magnitudes. 
APPENDIX 
I. Proof  of  Proposition  1 
Let z* be a  strict-path  equilibrium. Construct  the  equilibrium  W*  by  letting  W*  take  the  same  action  as z* at 
any  information set  reached  with  positive  probability under  z*,  and let  W*  take  the  mixed  action  eh at any 
information set h reached  with  zero  probability  under  z*,  but  not  precluded by  previous  choices  of  the  player 
moving at h. Notice that because 8 is  z*-compatible,  W*  is a  Nash equilibrium  contained  in  the relative  interior 
of c(.*).  Let H+ be the set  of  information sets  reached  with  positive  probability  under  equilibrium  W*  and let 
H- be the set  of information sets  reached  with  probability  zero  under  W* but  not precluded by previous  choices 
of the player  moving at the  information set. 
Let V(6,  E) be the set  of  states  such  that Ilzh, -  wt,  11 56  for all hie  H+  and ((zh,  -  wt,  )I  =<E for all hie  H-, where 
l(.II  is the max  Let  V be a neighbourhood  of  W*. 
Step 1.  Choose E* >  0 sufficiently  small  to ensure: 
(i)  V(&*,  E*) c V. This  can  be done because  V is a neighbourhood  of  W*. 
(ii)  V(0,  E*) is a set  of  strict-path  Nash equilibria  giving  the same  outcome  as W*  and contained  in  the 
relative interior of  c(.*).  This can be done because W*  lies  in  the relative  interior  of  c(.*). 
(iii)  There  exist  p >p  > 0 such that the  payoff  to  the action  specified  by  W*  at any  information set he H+ 
exceeds the payoff to every other  action available at h by  at least p;  while the payoffs to two  actions 
at  an  information set h€  H- differ by  at most  p. This  can  be  done because  W*  specifies strict best 
responses at information sets in H+,  while information sets  in  H- are unreached in equilibrium. 
(iv)  There exists ko  > 0 such that  at  every information set  in  he H+ and  for  every state in  V(&*,  E*), the 
total of the  subpopulation  proportions playing  each  of the nonequilibrium  actions  declines  at a  rate 
greater than  or equal to ko  . Condition (iii) and  the monotonicity  off ensure that this can be done. 
Step 2.  Choose 6 < &*/4 sufficiently  small  that, if  there  were  no  drift,  then  any  trajectory  beginning  in 
the set  V(6,  6) would  converge  to a  state  in  V(0,  ~*/4)  without  leaving  V(&,  E). We take V(S,6)  to be the set B 
of the theorem. To verify its existence,  consider  a trajectory  whose  initial condition lies  in  V(6,  6) c V(&*,  E*). 
Let a(t)  be  the largest  (over  the  information  sets in  H,)  proportion of a  subpopulation  at time t that is not 
playing the equilibrium  action specified by  W*. Then a(0)=<6  by  definition, and a(t)  decreases to zero at  an 
exponential rate  that is at least ko (from (iv)). In  addition, there  is  a  constant kl such that  the maximum  payoff 
difference  between  actions  at any information set h€ H- is  less  than kla(t).  The monotonicity  and Lipschitz 
continuity  off then  ensures  that there is a  constant  k2 such that  the  proportion  of the  subpopulation  playing 
action k at any information set  in he H- satisfies  lzhk(t)l <:  k2a(t).  We  then  need  only  choose  d<  &*/4  sufficiently 
small that  fhk(t)dt<sr  k2a(t)dt=<k2  6e-kn‘dt  = 6k2/ko  < &*/4 -  6. This  ensures  that  as  actions  at infor- 
mation sets in  H+ converge to the equilibrium  actions  specified  by  W*, the  proportion  playing an action at an 
information set in H- cannot change  by  more  than ~*/4  -  6,  and hence a  proportion  beginning  within  6 of  W* 
must  end  within  &*l4  of W*. 
Step  3.  For  each  sufficiently  large  n,  there  exists  yne  [0,  E*)  such  that  for  any  state  in 
V(&*,  &*)\V(yn,  E*), the  total  of  the  subpopulation  proportions  playing  each  of the nonequilibrium  actions  at 
any information set  in  H,,  under the perturbed  dynamic,  declines  at a  rate  that  is at least ko/2.  To verify this, 
fix an information set h€ H+ and let k* be the  equilibrium  action  at h. Then we  need to find a value y <  E*  such 
that  the final  inequality  in  the following  holds  (where  ‘‘k#k*” is a  shorthand  for ‘‘ke  A(h)\{k*)”): 
S-ko + 
k  <-0 
2’ 
32.  The max norm (Ix((  is  defined  by  ((X((  = maxi {(xi(),  where  1.1 is absolute value. 388  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
where y is the  total probability attached to nonequilibrium actions at h. By  letting n be large, and hence q,(p) 
be small, we can find a value y  E*  for which (5) holds. Let yn  be the smallest such y given n. Then limn+m  yn  = 
0 (because limn+oo  q,,(s)  = 0). 
Step 4.  For sufficiently large n, any trajectory beginning in V(S,  S) enters V(y.,  E*). To verify this, notice 
that for all states in the set V(&*,  &*)\V(y,, E*), the subpopulation proportion attached to nonequilibrium actions 
at each information  set in H+ declines at rate at least ko/2. If there were no drift, the absolute value  of  the 
derivative in the subpopulation  proportion  playing any action at  an information set in H- would be at most k2 
(from Step 2). We can then choose n sufficiently large that the absolute value of each such derivative with drift 
is  at  most  2k2. A  sufficient  condition  for  trajectories  beginning  in  V(6,  6)  to  enter  V(y,, E*)  is  then 
2k2  6e-k’2dt = 46k2/k0  E* -  6, which follows from our earlier choice of S to ensure Sk2/k0  < ~*/4  -  6. 
Step 5.  For all sufficiently large n,  the set V(y,,  E*) is forward invariant. In addition, let {A,,,},“=  o be a 
sequence of nonnegative numbers with limm-ta3  A,,,  = 0. For each A,,,,  there is a smallest value of n, denoted by 
n(m), such that any trajectory beginning in  V(Y,(~),  E*) enters and subsequently remains in  V(y,,,,,,,  e,,,).  The 
proof is then completed by taking the  latter to be our set U,,. To verify these claims, it suffices to examine actions 
at information sets in H-, since by definition the proportion of each subpopulation playing the equilibrium action 
at each information set  in  H+  is  growing at each state in  V(y,,  E*) in  which  this proportion is only 1 -  y,.  To 
check information sets in H-, we  note that the change in the subpopulation proportion playing an action k at 
an information set he  H- is given  by: 
ihk =fhk(Z) + qn(Ah)(ehk-Zhk). 
The result then follows from noting that qH(Ah)  2  V,@),  fhk(Z)  <  k2yn,  and 
In particular, this ensures that  for sufficiently large n, ihk takes the sign of  6hk -  Zhk whenever the absolute value 
of  the  latter  difference exceeds &,, > 0, no  matter  how  small  we  take &,,, which  yields  the result. To verify (6), 
notice that q@)/q(P)  approaches zero as n grows (because p  P). It then suffices to show that y,,/q(p) is 
bounded above  as ngrows. If not, then q(B)/y, approaches zero. But then yn  is not the smallest value of y for 
which (5) holds, which  is  a  contradiction.  11 
11.  Foundations 
This section presents the stochastic foundations of  (2). Our point of departure is a model in which each of the 
n populations contains a finite number of players N.  We consider a discrete-time model, with periods of length 
z,  so that players are matched to play the game at times (0, z,  22, . .  .}. The  state space is a finite subset ZNcZ, 
where 2, contains only those proportions that can be created by  assigning the N agents of each population to 
various pure strategies. We  let Zhik be the  proportion of the ith population playing action ke  A(hi)  at information 
set hi.  We often abbreviate this to simply zk. 
We shall be interested in the expected state at time t + z given state z(t). Let v = 1/N. Suppose there exists 
a function on h(z, v) on Zx [W,  such that 
Z{z(t  + z) Iz(t)} = z(t) + z[h(z(t),  v)]  + 0(z2N2)  (7) 
where 
h(z, v)  = h(z, 0) + qv).  (8) 
The first “z”  that appears  on  the  right side of (7) captures the fact that we  expect only small changes in the 
state to occur in small intervals of time. Binmore and Samuelson (1993) and Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan 
(1995) provide examples in  which (7) is derived from explicit models of how agents change their strategies. The 
key feature of these models is that in each period of length z, each agent takes an independent draw  that causes 
them to retain their current strategy with probability l -  z and consider changing to a new strategy with prob- 
ability z.33  The “0(v)” in (8) allows us to think of  h(z, 0)  as the change that would be expected in an infinite 
33.  It suffices that the probability of changing strategies is proportional to z. The probability that exactly 
one agent considers changing strategies is zN + 0(z2N2)  while the probability that more than one agent considers 
changing is 0(z2N2).  Given that one agent changes strategies, the result is  to move z by  at most  I/N in  a 
direction described by h(z, v), giving an expected movement that is described by (7). BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  389 
population, with the expected  change  in  a finite population of  size  N,  given  by  h(z,  v), departing  from this as  a 
result  of  finite-sampling  effects by an amount  that decreases  with the  population size. 
We  now  consider the differential equation 
j = h(z,  0). 
We can  rearrange (7) to give 
We now  direct attention to the case in  which the  populations  are  large and  the interval  of  time z is short. Letting 
the  population grow  allows  us to smooth some of the randomness in the system,  while  letting z shrink gives us 
a model in  which  agents’  strategy  revisions  occur  at idiosyncratic, uncoordinated times. As  we  take  the  limits 
z+O  and N+w, with  zN2  +O,  the left  side  of  (10)  appears to become the derivative dzldt, causing  (10)  to 
converge to (9). The only apparent sticking point is the removal  of the expectation on  the left  side  of (10). This 
removal  is  often  justified  with  an informal  law-of-large-numbers  argument.34 
When can the  link  between  (10) and (9) be established  formally?  Binmore,  Samuelson  and Vaughan  [(1995), 
Theorem  l], using  techniques  introduced  by  Borgers and  Sarin  (1995) and Boylan  (1997,  1995),  establish  such 
a link for  a  model  with  one  population  and  a  one-dimensional state space. The following  proposition  extends 
this  result  to the  current  model. We assume that there  exist  a finite S such that,  for  any information set i and 
action k~ A(hi), 
P{(Zik(t+z)-Zik(t))2~Z(t)}=<zVS+  O(z2N2).  (1 1) 
This condition is  satisfied in the models  developed in Binmore and Samuelson  (1993) and Binmore et al. (1995). 
To see  why  we  expect it to hold,  notice  that if h is continuous, then  (10)  ensures  that there  is  S’ with 
/{z(t+z)-z(t)(z(t)}~ZS’+O(Z2N2). 
But the key difference  between  zr+ -  zt and (z~+~  -z~)~  is that  an  agent  who  switches  strategies  appears  as  a 
term  whose  magnitude  is  l/N in the former and  1/N2 in the  latter,  and it is  this  extra “N” in the  denominator 
that accounts for  our  condition (1 1)  on F  { (zI+ -  Z~)~)Z,  1. 
Proposition 2.  Let (7) and (1 1) hold, and let h(z, v)  be Lipschitz continuous on Z (in  the  max norm on Z), 
with Lipschitz constant  C holding for all sufJiciently smull  v. Then for any  time  T and any  E, we  can choose a 
sufficiently large Nand  sufficiently small z (so that zN2  is sufficiently small)  that the realization of the underlying 
stochastic strategy adjustment model at  any  time  tE [0,  T]  is within E  (in  terms  of  the max  norm) of the  expected 
value given by (9) with probability  at least 1 -  E. 
Proof.  Step 1.  Fix a value T>  0 and fix a  rational  initial condition z(0). Unless  otherwise  stated, t will 
be  assumed  to be admissible, i.e. to be  of  the  form t = kz for some  integer k.  We  assume that N is  always  such 
that z(O)E 2,.  We let y(t) be the solution to the differential equation j  = h( y,  0) given initial condition y(0)  = 
z(0). Our task is to show that,  for  any admissible t  =< T, 
Let  Y(t)  solve Y=  h( Y,  v).  Then it suffices to show, for any  admissible  t 5 T,  that 
prob {  11 Y(t)  -  z(t)II lie}  <  E. 
Step 2.  We  first establish (13).  Because h( y,  0)  is  Lipschitz continuous on 2 and h( y,  v)  = h( y,  0)  + O(v), 
there  exists K such that,  for any pair of states X  and y, 
llh(x,  0) -h(.Y, 0)ll~KIlx  -YII 
114  Y,  0) -h( Y,  v>ll  =<Kv. 
34.  See,  for example,  van  Damme [(  1984),  ch. 9.41 and  Hofbauer  and Sigmund [(l 988), ch. 16. l]. 390  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
We then have: 
For any ust,  we then also have 
where IIy(u) -  Y(u) 11 is nonnegative and continuous. We can then invoke Gronwall’s lemma (Hirsch and Smale 
[(1974), p. 1691) to conclude: 
Ily(z) -  Y(T)\I sKvteK‘  <  E, 
where the final inequality holds if N is  sufficiently large (and hence v small). 
Step 3.  We now turn  to  (14). Our first step is to notice that 
Y(t) -  z(0) =  h( Y(s),  v)&.  I: 
The next step is to find a corresponding expression for z(t) -  z(0). Define: 
rn(kT) = Z(k2) -  z(0) -  *  V{Z(jT)  -  z(jz -  T)lZO’T -  7)). 
z(t)-z(0)=  m(t)+x;= ~{zo‘z)-zo’T-z)(zo’z-T)) 
On rearranging, we get, for t = kz, 
= m(t)  +  g=  * h(zO’z -  T), v) + kO(T2N2) 
= m(t)  + /‘  h(z([s/z]z), v)& + O(TN2), 
0 
where [X] denotes the integer part of X and kO(z2N2)  = O(kz2N2)  = O(tzN2)  = O(zN2).  Now we subtract (17) 
from (1  5) to get (where 1. I is a vector of absolute values): 
1 Y(t) -  z(t)  1 =< Im(t)  I +  Jh(  Y(s),  v) -  h(z([s/z]z), v)  1 dr + O(zN2).  I: 
for 
This implies that 
II~(~>-z(~>lI~ll~(~)ll+  llh(Y(S)’ v)-h(z([s/zlz),  v)Ilds+ OW2) 
where h(z, v)  is  Lipschitz continuous  on 2  with Lipschitz C for all sufficiently small v. This in turn implies that, 
for all U  St,  we have 
where 
M4  =  sup  Ilm([s/zlz)II + O(zN2)  + O(z), 
OSsQt 
where the final O(z) is added so that (18) holds for all U  =<t  and not just admissible U (i.e. U of the form kt for 
some k). Again noting that 1) Y(u)  -z([u/z]z))I is nonnegative and continuous at all but finitely many points, we BINMORE & SAMUELSON  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  39 1 
can apply Gronwall's lemma to (18) to obtain 
I1 Ut)  -  z([t/zlz) II -weC' 
for all t with 0Str  T.35  We  use  this to conclude that, for all admissible t, 
prob{IIY(t)-z(t)IILiE}'prob  {IIM(t)ll'$Ee-"'}. 
It then suffices to show, for admissible t, 
prob  max  Ilrn(,s)Jl  ~~E-"'  66, 
where z and zN2  are taken to be  sufficiently  small  that the error terms in the definition of M(t)  are less than 
~e-~*/4.  Hence, letting rni(t) be an element  of  rn(t), it suffices to show that,  for  large N and small z and zN2 
(where IZI  denotes the dimension of Z), 
i  OSs51  l 
i  osssr  l  ,;l  (19) 
prob  max Irn,(s:)l2a~e-~'  -I-, 
since the probability that Ilmi(s)I(  exceeds  in  the max norm is  less  than the sum of the probabilities that 
Imi(s)l exceed $&e-"'  and there are 121  such probabilities. 
Step 4.  We  now  use  inequality (19). From Kolmogorov's inequality, we have (hereafter deleting the "i', 
subs~ript)~~ 
prob  max Irn(s)  I  L$Ee--C' 5-  var { m(t)}  .  I  l  OLssr 
Hence, since the expected value of m(t)  is zero, it suffices for (1 9) to show that,  for all t 2 T, 
To do this, we  define (hereafter 
Then, if j > l, we  have 
&{AjAl} = F{A/,F{Ajl~(h)}}  = 0, 
since F{AjIz(lz)}  = Z{m(jz)Iz(k)}  -  i${m(jz -  z)lz(k)} = m(lz)  -m(lz) = 0. Then we have 
Hence, it suffices for (21) that 
Since d  {A,} = P  { m(jz)  -  m(jz -  z)} = 0, we have 
8  {Aj}'  = var Aj = &'{(z(jz -  z(jz -  ~))~lz(jz  -  z)} 
-<zvS+ 0(z2N2). 
35.  Gronwall's lemma is typically stated with the requirement that the integrand be continuous. However, 
the proof  requires only that the derivative of the integral be  integrable, which  will  hold if  the integrand  is 
continuous almost everywhere. 
36.  If the increments rn(j7) -  m(jz -  z) where independent, (20) would be a statement of a simple form of 
Kolmogorov's inequality for sums of independent random variables (Billingsley  [(1986),  p. 2961). In our case, 
these increments are  not  independent, since the distribution  of mGz) may  depend on  the  realized value of 
m(jz -  7). However, Kolmogorov's inequality requires only that m(t)  is a martingale (Chung [(1974), p. 3311). 392  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
Equation (22) then becomes 
X:=,  cP{Aj]2<k(zvS+  0(z2N2)) 
=< TvS + O(zN2) 
where the final inequality holds as long as N is large and zN2  is small.  (1 
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